The Boring Company

IWhat it does

The Boring Company is a private company that digs tunnels. Elon Musk first floated the idea in December 2016²³, and the company was spun off from SpaceX in 2018³. It is not listed on any exchange and its shares cannot be bought on a public market. This page is research, not investment advice.

The product it sells is called Loop. A Loop is a small-diameter road tunnel, with stations at each end, through which Tesla cars carry passengers. The company describes the idea as Teslas in tunnels²⁰. In Las Vegas the cars have drivers: Fortune reported in 2023 that the company had dropped its self-driving plans and employs drivers¹⁰, and ProPublica described driver-operated Teslas in January 2025²⁵. Plans in Dubai refer to autonomous Tesla cars, but that comes from press reports of the Dubai plan and I have not seen the contract⁵.

The company builds nearly everything itself. Its own page says it designs and builds the tunnel boring machines (called Prufrock) and the concrete tunnel liners, designs and builds the Loop, and then operates it¹⁹. Prufrock is meant to install the liner while it digs, instead of stopping every five feet as a conventional soft-ground machine does¹⁹. That is a company description, not an independent test.

There are three live places. In Las Vegas, the Vegas Loop began with a convention centre tunnel in 2021 and has grown to about 14 stations by the company’s own table¹⁸. In Nashville, tunnelling began in early 2026 on a route from downtown to the airport⁴¹². In Dubai, a government contract for a first phase of a Loop was announced in February 2026¹¹. In February 2026 the board of a Florida special district scored the company highest of three bidders and voted to proceed with it to design and build underground transit around Universal Orlando, though plans had not been released³².

The company also holds a list of proposals that did not turn into built tunnels. NBC News reported in 2021 that a Chicago transport department spokesman said the O’Hare express plan had been dropped, that the Washington to Baltimore line had been removed from the company’s website, and that its Los Angeles projects had stalled³⁰. The company dropped a Los Angeles tunnel under the 405 freeway in 2018 after local lawsuits²⁹. In San Antonio, the regional mobility authority said the company stopped responding after being selected in 2022³¹. Those matter because they show how often an announced plan has not turned into a built tunnel.

IIHow it makes money

I could not find any revenue figure for the company, reported or claimed. The September 2026 coverage of the funding round says so directly by omission: none of the articles I opened gave revenue, ridership or an employee count¹⁴⁵. Everything below about money is therefore my own estimate built from the contracts and fares that are public. Treat each number as a rough size, not a measurement.

The first source is Vegas Loop operations. The Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (the LVCVA, which runs the convention centre) awarded the company a tunnel contract of about $48.6 million in 2019²⁴ and committed about $52.5 million in bonds to the convention centre loop, which the agency repays²⁵. Fortune reported that the LVCVA also pays the company about $4.5 million a year to run the system, which its own calculation put at about $7.50 per ride¹⁰. Fares on the company’s page are $5 from the convention centre to the Strip and $8 to the Thomas and Mack Center¹⁸. A company director quoted a $4.50 fare and a $13 day pass⁷.

A rough size for Vegas: Fortune reported, citing the LVCVA, that about 1.2 million convention attendees had ridden since the June 2021 opening, as of November 2023, which is not audited¹⁰. EVXL calculated about 2,200 rides a day averaged over five years⁷. At a few dollars a ride, plus the LVCVA payment, I put Vegas operating revenue in the single-digit to low double-digit millions of dollars a year. That is my estimate. It could be wrong by a factor of two either way, and many convention rides may be free or bundled.

The second source is building tunnels for someone else. Dubai’s Roads and Transport Authority announced a first phase of Dubai Loop costing about 565 million dirhams, which press convert to $153.8 million (rate about 3.67 dirhams per dollar)⁵. The pilot is 6.4 km with four stations, and the full network is quoted at 22 km with 19 stations at about 2 billion dirhams, or roughly $545 million⁵¹¹. How much of that cost reaches the Boring Company as revenue is not disclosed. Contract terms and who pays are not stated¹¹.

The third source is self-funded systems such as Nashville, where the company funds the build and hopes to earn fares and station fees. No revenue is reported, and the funding is private, so this is an investment by the company, not income³¹².

In short, today’s revenue is probably small relative to a $23 billion valuation. The company is better described as a builder with one small operating system and a few large projects, whose reported valuation reflects expected growth in contracts such as the UAE.

Revenue-related facts that are public. Reported means the company or a government said it; press-reported means unnamed sources; estimated is mine.

IIIThe market and the competition

The company is selling urban transport and tunnel construction. Those are two different markets with different rivals. In city transport the alternatives are buses, rail, rideshare and, for short hops, walking. In tunnel construction the alternatives are established contractors that build metros, road and utility tunnels with large machines.

On the transport side, the pitch is a fast point to point ride for a low price per mile of tunnel. The company says its target all-in cost is below $5 million a mile for a Loop tunnel¹⁹, and a company director said tunnelling costs $5 million to $10 million a mile depending on ground⁷. Those are claims. The Dubai pilot works out to about $24 million per km, or roughly $38 million per mile, on the announced budget (my arithmetic from s5 and s11), though I do not know what that budget includes beyond tunnels, such as stations, vehicles and operations. The gap between claim and announced budget is one of the main things to watch.

Capacity is the other issue. The company says the Vegas Loop is designed to reach 90,000 passengers an hour when complete, and that the convention centre loop is designed for 4,400 an hour²⁰. TechCrunch reported in November 2021 that the highest hourly flow the convention centre system had carried by mid-July of that year was 1,355 passengers, against a goal of 4,400²⁸. I found no independent measurement of the 90,000 figure, and a Las Vegas transit agency official told ProPublica the agency could not evaluate the company’s ridership claims because the system is private²⁵. A company director says it moves about 40,000 passengers on busy convention days⁷. A metro line moves tens of thousands per hour, so the Loop competes more as a premium shuttle than as mass transit. EVXL argues the typical day would not rank in the top 25 US transit systems⁷.

On the construction side, the rivals are the large listed contractors and the private machine makers. I use two listed infrastructure companies below as price references: Vinci and Ferrovial¹⁵¹⁶. They are far larger and diversified. They do not sell Teslas in tunnels, but they can bid for the same government budgets.

Local politics shape the market too. In Nashville the route runs under state-owned roads, only serves Tesla taxis, and the Metro Nashville Council has voted to oppose it, with critics raising oversight and transparency concerns¹². In Las Vegas, Clark County approved a 50-year franchise in 2021²⁵, and the company reports approval of a large build-out¹⁸.

IVThe moat and how it could be disrupted

I rate the moat as contestable. The advantages are real, but none yet looks durable. The company has approvals in Las Vegas for a large network, in-house machine design, a famous founder, and a first government contract abroad. Each of these can be copied or lost.

Regulatory permission is the strongest piece. Clark County and the City of Las Vegas approved 68 miles of tunnel and 123 stations according to the company¹⁸, and the county approved a 50-year franchise in 2021²⁵. An approved route is hard for a rival to duplicate on the same streets. But the approval is only a right to build, and the system today is about 14 stations¹⁸.

Vertical integration is the second piece. Because it builds machines, liners and the operating system, the company can in principle lower cost and learn faster than a contractor that buys equipment. The evidence is mixed. Its own page targets one mile a week for Prufrock¹⁹, while a company director said actual progress is about one mile a month versus a design spec near one mile a week⁷. Learning curves like this are real moats only if the gap to rivals widens, and I cannot see that gap from public data.

Brand and distribution are the third piece. Governments in Nashville and Dubai are plainly open to talking with the company, and Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed of Dubai met its president in September 2026, according to the Roads and Transport Authority news listing²². That access probably comes in part from the founder’s profile and from the Tesla link. It is a real advantage in winning a first meeting, but it does not stop a city from choosing rail or a rival bid once the cost and safety questions come in.

There is no network effect today in the usual sense. Each Loop system is a separate local network, and a rider in Dubai gains nothing from a rider in Las Vegas. Switching costs for a city are high only after a tunnel exists.

How it could break. A cheaper machine from an established maker could close the cost gap. A safety event in a single-lane tunnel could stop service. Autonomous Tesla taxis on open streets could make the tunnel unnecessary for some trips, and above-ground expansion would face its own permits and regulators. A change in the founder’s attention or in the Tesla relationship would also hurt, since the product is built around Tesla cars²⁰.

VThe numbers we can see

Very few numbers are public, and most are claims. What we have are the funding history, a ridership total, some contract values and a few operating facts.

Funding history. Musk reportedly put in about $100 million of his own money early on, according to Fortune citing a biography¹⁰. The company then raised $120 million in July 2019, its first outside investment²⁴, then $675 million in April 2022 at $5.675 billion⁹, then $3 billion in September 2026 at $23 billion, according to its own announcement⁸. Between the 2022 and 2026 valuations the stated value rose by about 4.05 times (my arithmetic, 23 divided by 5.675)⁴⁹⁸.

Valuation reports differ. In July 2026 the Wall Street Journal, via TechCrunch, reported talks to raise $4 billion at a $20 billion valuation, and said terms could change². On September 4 the Journal reported a valuation of about $20 billion, citing unnamed people³. On September 9 the company announced $3 billion and said the financing values it at $23 billion, without saying whether that is before or after the new money⁸; the press reported it on September 10¹⁴. The simplest reading is $20 billion before the money and $23 billion after, but no source I opened says so, and TechCrunch notes no pre-money figure. I treat the $23 billion as the headline and flag this as an inference.

Investor lists also differ. TechCrunch names the UAE as lead, with Andreessen Horowitz, Sequoia Capital, Human Capital, Vy Capital and Valor Equity Partners¹. The Next Web adds Temasek, Shamal Holding and Baron Capital⁴. The National names only the UAE as lead⁵. I cannot tell from the sources whether the longer list is complete or simply better reported.

A reported term in the round: according to the Journal, investors had to help recruit staff or make introductions to officials in target cities, and the company could buy back some of their shares if they failed to deliver candidates³. Musk replied ’True’ on X, according to the reports³⁴. The clause was not in the company’s announcement⁴. This is unusual and it suggests the company thinks access to governments and talent is a bottleneck.

Operating facts. The company’s own page says more than 4 million passengers, 14 stations now and 28 projected by year end, and 68 miles and 123 stations approved¹⁸. Another page lists 104 stations in the long-run design²⁰, and a company director cited 104 stations too⁷, so the station count has shifted between 100 and 123 depending on the source and date. EVXL reported 11 stations open in July 2026⁷, while the company’s page shows 14 now¹⁸. I would not rely on any single count.

Fines and incidents matter for cost. ProPublica reported that Nevada OSHA fined the company more than $112,000 after complaints in late 2023, which the company contests²⁶. In May 2025 Nevada OSHA served notice of more than $400,000 in penalties ($425,595 proposed), and the citations were rescinded about a day later after the company’s president called the governor’s office²⁷. A separate fine of nearly $500,000 came from Clark County’s water regulator for dumping drilling fluid into manholes²⁷.

Funding and valuation record. Source types: company or primary where marked, otherwise press-reported.

VIWho runs it and who owns it

Elon Musk founded the company and is the public face. Steve Davis is its president and signs for it in the UAE, including the Abu Dhabi agreement announced in October 2026⁶. The company’s own pages I opened do not state titles, so I use the title The National gives him.

Musk’s current ownership share is not in any source I could open. Early funding came mostly from Musk, then venture investors bought in during 2019 and 2022, and now the UAE-led group¹⁰²⁴⁹¹. I do not know what share each holds, the preference terms of the 2026 round, or how much Musk owns. This matters because an outside minority holder’s rights depend on those terms.

There is a link with Musk’s other businesses. SpaceX went public in June 2026 in an offering that raised $86 billion, according to the Journal’s report on the Boring Company round³. The Boring Company spun out of SpaceX in 2018³. It is also built around Tesla cars²⁰. These links bring both benefits (brand, vehicles, engineering talent) and risk (related-party dealing, and a founder with many calls on his time). I have no evidence on related-party terms.

On people: the company’s own pages I opened give no headcount, and Fortune cited a PitchBook estimate of about 270 employees in 2023¹⁰. The careers page lists about 133 open roles across Las Vegas, Nashville, Bastrop, San Antonio and Dubai²¹. A company that lists that many openings is growing its staff, which fits the investor recruiting clause³. The jobs spread is also notable, since most are operations roles (about 60) rather than engineering (about 37)²¹.

VIIValuation: is the last price supported?

Equity value in US$ billions. Not a share price: a private company has none. Latest mark: primary round (Series D), company-announced valuation; pre or post money not stated.

What the last valuation assumes

At $23 billion the price needs a company with a much larger business than anything visible. Using my base-case multiple of 4.0 times revenue and a 13 per cent discount rate, $23 billion needs 2035 revenue near $15 billion with modest dilution, or a far higher multiple. The only revenue figures we can see are a Vegas operation in the single or low double-digit millions (my estimate) and one Dubai contract of about $154 million for a first phase. The price also assumes that the UAE programme of more than 150 km becomes signed work, that the cost per mile of delivered Loops comes down toward the company’s target, and that cities outside the Gulf buy in.

Bear, base and bull

• Bear. 2035 revenue of $1.5 billion: Vegas and Nashville stay small, Dubai pilot and a modest UAE programme only. Terminal enterprise value at 2.0 times revenue, between a mature contractor (Vinci about 1.2 times) and a premium concession owner (Ferrovial about 4.5 times). 15 per cent future dilution, 15 per cent discount rate for an unproven venture, and $0.5 billion of the 2026 cash left at the end. Equity value about $1.2 billion.
• Base. 2035 revenue of $5 billion: the UAE converts about 150 km at roughly the Dubai cost of $24 million per km (about $3.7 billion of build value, my arithmetic) over several years, plus US systems and operations. Terminal enterprise value at 4.0 times revenue, near Ferrovial’s EV to sales. 15 per cent dilution, 13 per cent discount rate, $1.0 billion of cash left. Equity value about $6.7 billion.
• Bull. 2035 revenue of $25 billion: many cities adopt Loop and a large share is operated by the company with recurring fares. Terminal EV at 5.0 times revenue, a premium to Ferrovial but a fraction of Tesla’s 16 times sales. 10 per cent dilution, 12 per cent discount rate, $2.0 billion cash left. Equity value about $42.6 billion.

Comparables used

Where I come down

The latest valuation of $23 billion is well above my base of about $6.7 billion, roughly 3.4 times as high, and above even my 75 per cent margin of safety value of $5 billion. It is below my bull case of $42.6 billion, so the market is pricing something between my base and bull. To be right, you would have to believe that the UAE deal turns into several billion dollars of contracts at healthy margin, and that at least one other large buyer follows. The market may be right even if this looks high. Buyers in the round include sovereign and large venture investors who may have seen contracts, pipelines or cost data that are not public, and the founder has a record of raising capital for businesses that later grew far beyond early financials. A sovereign lead that is also a customer may also treat the price as partly a strategic payment, not only a financial one. I cannot verify any of that. Valuations of this kind move on announcements, and a single signed contract could shift my bull and base cases.

What I cannot judge

I cannot judge the company’s revenue, margins, cash burn, debt, cap table, Musk’s stake, the preference terms of the Series D, the terms and payment profile of the Dubai contract, or the real cost per mile of the Vegas and Nashville tunnels. I could not open the Las Vegas Review-Journal or Las Vegas Sun articles, the Nevada Transportation Authority filings, or the Tennessee government release, so tax, regulatory and Nashville cost points rest on other sources. Search was limited, so I did not find the actual SEC, state or court filings that might hold financial detail. My model uses a ten-year revenue scenario that is entirely my own, so the range from about $1 billion to about $43 billion is wide on purpose. Do not read the base as a forecast.

VIIIThe IPO

No IPO plan reported. I found no report of an IPO filing, confidential or public, and no announced sale or merger. The company just raised $3 billion privately, which lowers the need to list soon¹. SpaceX, the company the Boring Company spun out of, listed in June 2026 with a planned price of $135 a share and a valuation near $1.75 trillion, which shows that Musk-linked listings are possible¹³. That is not a signal about the Boring Company.

What to watch

• Any filing, banker mandate or press report of a listing or a combination with another Musk company
• Audited or leaked revenue and cash burn for 2025 and 2026
• Signed UAE contracts that name routes, costs and payment terms for the 150 km programme
• Whether the Dubai pilot and the Vegas airport connector open on the dates given
• Nashville progress, council action and the 2027 opening estimate
• A pre-money and post-money split for the Series D, and the final investor list
• Safety incidents, fines and changes to county safety rules in Las Vegas

IXWhat could go wrong

Delivery risk is first. The Vegas airport connector had a first-quarter 2026 target in December and was described in July as a few months away⁷. The Nashville loop has a company estimate of a first-quarter 2027 opening, and tunnelling only began in early 2026⁷⁴. The Dubai pilot’s timing is reported loosely: The National said construction was under way as of May 2026 and operations were expected within two years⁶, while Gulf News gave execution within one to two years and no start date¹¹. Slips are normal in tunnelling, but a company priced on growth cannot slip often.

Cost risk is second. The company aims for a cost below $5 million a mile¹⁹. Dubai’s announced budget works out near $38 million a mile⁵¹¹. If the true cost of a turnkey Loop is near the second figure, the advantage over conventional tunnelling narrows a lot. If Dubai’s figure includes much more than tunnelling, the comparison is unfair. I cannot tell which.

Demand risk is third. The system carries small numbers compared with transit systems⁷, and the airport and Strip links are meant to lift that. A tunnel with high fixed cost and low use does not earn back its capital. Dubai’s estimate of 13,000 passengers a day for the pilot and 30,000 a day for the full network are government planning figures, not outcomes¹¹.

Safety and regulatory risk is fourth. The company has had fines and citations in Nevada²⁶²⁷. A fire or flooding event in a one-lane tunnel could close a line. In Nashville, the council voted to oppose the project¹².

Concentration risk is fifth. The 2026 round was UAE-led, and the stated use of funds is to speed a UAE programme of more than 150 km of tunnels⁵. Reporting says the company has not disclosed where those tunnels go, what they cost or when they finish⁵. Abu Dhabi’s agreement is exploratory, with no routes, schedules or costs⁶. If the same sovereign investors are also the customers, then the revenue and the equity depend on one relationship.

What most likely destroys the business: the cost per mile of delivered, operating Loops staying several times above the company’s target while governments pay late or cancel. The business has to win on speed and cost, and without those it is a taxi service with a tunnel.

What has to go right at the same time, multiplied out. For my base case I need (a) the UAE programme to convert from an announcement into contracts, which I put at around one in two; (b) delivered cost per km to fall enough to earn a margin, around two in three; (c) at least one more country or large city outside the UAE and the US to sign, around one in two; (d) no safety event that halts a major line, around four in five; and (e) the founder staying engaged, around nine in ten. Multiplying these gives about 0.5 x 0.67 x 0.5 x 0.8 x 0.9, or roughly 12 per cent for the whole set. These odds are my judgment, not data, and they are not independent, but they show why the base case is hard to reach.

The next best use of the same dollar. Someone who wants infrastructure exposure could instead look at listed contractors such as Vinci or Ferrovial, which show real revenue and cash flow¹⁵¹⁶. Those are not the same business and offer no founder upside, but they have audited numbers. For Musk-linked exposure, SpaceX is now listed at a very high revenue multiple¹³. I do not recommend any of these; I name them to show the choice an owner would face.